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ABSTRACT
In Autonomous Vehicles (AVs), one fundamental pillar is perception,
which leverages sensors like cameras and LiDARs (Light Detection
and Ranging) to understand the driving environment. Due to its
direct impact on road safety, multiple prior efforts have been made
to study its the security of perception systems. In contrast to prior
work that concentrates on camera-based perception, in this work
we perform the first security study of LiDAR-based perception in
AV settings, which is highly important but unexplored. We consider
LiDAR spoofing attacks as the threat model and set the attack goal
as spoofing obstacles close to the front of a victim AV. We find
that blindly applying LiDAR spoofing is insufficient to achieve this
goal due to the machine learning-based object detection process.
Thus, we then explore the possibility of strategically controlling the
spoofed attack to fool the machine learning model. We formulate
this task as an optimization problem and design modeling meth-
ods for the input perturbation function and the objective function.
We also identify the inherent limitations of directly solving the
problem using optimization and design an algorithm that combines
optimization and global sampling, which improves the attack suc-
cess rates to around 75%. As a case study to understand the attack
impact at the AV driving decision level, we construct and evaluate
two attack scenarios that may damage road safety and mobility.
We also discuss defense directions at the AV system, sensor, and
machine learning model levels.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Autonomous vehicles, or self-driving cars, are under rapid develop-
ment, with some vehicles already found on public roads [9, 12, 14]
In AV systems, one fundamental pillar is perception, which leverages
sensors like cameras and LiDARs (Light Detection and Ranging)
to understand the surrounding driving environment. Since such
function is directly related to safety-critical driving decisions such
as collision avoidance, multiple prior research efforts have been
made to study the security of camera-based perception in AV set-
tings. For example, prior work has reported sensor-level attacks
such as camera blinding [42], physical-world camera attacks such
as adding stickers to traffic signs [28, 29], and trojan attacks on the
neural networks for AV camera input [37].
Despite the research efforts in camera-based perception, there
is no thorough exploration into the security of LiDAR-based per-
ception in AV settings. LiDARs, which measure distances to sur-
rounding obstacles using infrared lasers, can provide 360-degree
viewing angles and generate 3-dimensional representations of the
road environment instead of just 2-dimensional images for cameras.
Thus, they are generally considered as more important sensors than
cameras for AV driving safety [3, 13] and are adopted by nearly all
AV makers today [4, 5, 7, 11]. A few recent works demonstrated
the feasibility of injecting spoofed points into the sensor input
from the LiDAR [42, 44]. Since such input also needs to be pro-
cessed by an object detection step in the AV perception pipeline,
it is largely unclear whether such spoofing can directly lead to
semantically-impactful security consequences, e.g., adding spoofed
road obstacles, in the LiDAR-based perception in AV systems.
In this work, we perform the first study to explore the security
of LiDAR-based perception in AV settings. To perform the analysis,
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we target the LiDAR-based perception implementation in Baidu
Apollo, an open-source AV system that has over 100 partners and
has reached a mass production agreement with multiple partners
such as Volvo and Ford [8, 9]. We consider a LiDAR spoofing attack,
i.e., injecting spoofed LiDAR data points by shooting lasers, as
our threat model since it has demonstrated feasibility in previous
work [42, 44]. With this threat model, we set the attack goal as
adding spoofed obstacles in close distances to the front of a victim
AV (or front-near obstacles) in order to alter its driving decisions.
In our study, we first reproduce the LiDAR spoofing attack from
the work done by Shin et al. [44] and try to exploit Baidu Apollo’s
LiDAR-based perception pipeline, which leverages machine learn-
ing for object detection as with the majority of the state-of-the-art
LiDAR-based AV perception techniques [6]. We enumerate different
spoofing patterns from the previous work, e.g., a spoofed wall, and
different spoofing angles and shapes, but none of them succeed
in generating a spoofed road obstacle after the machine learning
step. We find that a potential reason is that the current spoofing
technique can only cover a very narrow spoofing angle, i.e., 8◦ hori-
zontally in our experiments, which is not enough to generate a point
cloud of a road obstacle near the front of a vehicle. Thus, blindly
applying existing spoofing techniques cannot easily succeed.
To achieve the attack goal with existing spoofing techniques, we
explore the possibility of strategically controlling the spoofed points
to fool the machine learning model in the object detection step.
While it is known that machine learning output can be maliciously
altered by carefully-crafted perturbations to the input [18, 20, 29, 41,
57], no prior work studied LiDAR-based object detection models for
AV systems. To approach this problem, we formulate the attack task
as an optimization problem, which has been shown to be effective
in previous machine learning security studies [21, 24, 26, 50, 51, 53].
Specific to our study, two functions need to be newly formulated:
(1) an input perturbation function that models LiDAR spoofing
capability in changing machine learning model input, and (2) an
objective function that can reflect the attack goal. For the former,
since previous work did not perform detailed measurements for the
purpose of such modeling, we experimentally explore the capability
of controlling the spoofed data points, e.g., the number of points and
their positions. Next, we design a set of global spatial transformation
functions to model these observed attack capabilities at the model
input level. In this step, both the quantified attack capabilities and
the modeling methodology are useful for future security studies of
LiDAR-related machine learning models.
For the attack goal of adding front-near obstacles, designing a
objective function is also non-trivial since the machine learning
model output is post-processed in the perception module of Baidu
Apollo before it is converted to a list of perceived obstacles. To
address this, we study the post-processing logic, extract key strate-
gies of transforming model output into perceived obstacles, and
formulate it into the objective function.
With the optimization problem mathematically formulated, we
start by directly solving it using optimization algorithms like previ-
ous studies [21]. However, we find that the average success rate of
adding front-near obstacles is only 30%. We find that this is actually
caused by the nature of the problem, which makes it easy for any
optimization algorithm to get trapped in local extrema. To solve this
problem, we design an algorithm that combines global sampling
and optimization, which is able to successfully increase the average
success rates to around 75%.
As a case study for understanding the impact of the discovered
attack input at the AV driving decision level, we construct two
attack scenarios: (1) emergency brake attack, which may force a
moving AV to suddenly brake and thus injure the passengers or
cause rear-end collisions, and (2) AV freezing attack, which may
cause an AV waiting for the red light to be permanently “frozen” in
the intersection and block traffic. Using real-world AV driving data
traces released by the Baidu Apollo team, both attacks successfully
trigger the attacker-desired driving decisions in Apollo’s simulator.
Based on the insights from our security analysis, we propose
defense solutions not only at AV system level, e.g., filtering out
LiDAR data points from ground reflection, but also at sensor and
machine learning model levels.
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
• We perform the first security study of LiDAR-based percep-
tion for AV systems. We find that blindly applying existing
LiDAR spoofing techniques cannot easily succeed in generat-
ing semantically-impactful security consequences after the
machine learning-based object detection step. To achieve the
attack goal with existing spoofing techniques, we then ex-
plore the possibility of strategically controlling the spoofed
points to fool the machine learning model, and formulate
the attack as an optimization problem.
• To perform analysis for the machine learning model used
in LiDAR-based AV perception, we make two methodology-
level contributions. First, we conduct experiments to analyze
the LiDAR spoofing attack capability and design a global spa-
tial transformation based method to model such capability
in mathematical forms. Second, we identify inherent limita-
tions of directly solving our problem using optimization, and
design an algorithm that combines optimization and global
sampling. This is able to increase the attack success rates to
around 75%.
• As a case study to understand the impact of the attacks at the
AV driving decision level, we construct two potential attack
scenarios: emergency brake attack, which may hurt the pas-
sengers or cause a rear-end collision, and AV freezing attack,
which may block traffic. Using a simulation based evalua-
tion on real-world AV driving data, both attacks successfully
trigger the attacker-desired driving decisions. Based on the
insights, we discuss defense directions at AV system, sensor,
and machine learning model levels.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 LiDAR-based Perception in AV Systems
AVs rely on various sensors to perform real-time positioning (also
called localization) and environment perception (or simply percep-
tion). LiDAR, camera, radar, and GPS/IMU are major sensors used
by various autonomous driving systems. The data collected from
those sensors are transformed and processed before it becomes
useful information for AV systems. Fig. 1 shows the data processing
pipeline of LiDAR sensor data in the perception module of Baidu
Apollo [4]. As shown, it involves three main steps as follows:
Figure 1: Overview of the data processing pipeline for LiDAR-based perception in Baidu Apollo.
Step 1: Pre processing. The raw LiDAR sensor input is called
3D point cloud and we denote it as X . The dimension of X is n × 4,
where n denotes the number of data points and each data point
is a 4-dimension vector with the 3D coordinates, wx, wy, and wz,
and the intensity of the point. In the pre-processing step, X is first
transformed into an absolute coordinate system. Next, the Region
of Interest (ROI) filter removes unrelated portions of the 3D point
cloud data, e.g., those that are outside of the road, based on HDMap
information. Next, a feature generation process generates a feature
matrix x (8 × 512 × 512), which is the input to the subsequent
machine learning model. In this process, the ROI-filtered 3D point
cloud within the range (60 meters by default) is mapped to 512×512
cells according to the wx and wy coordinates. In each cell, the
assigned points are used to generate 8 features as listed in Table 1.
Step 2: DNN-based object detection. A Deep Neural Network
(DNN) then takes the feature matrix x as input and produces a set
of output metrics for each cell, e.g., the probability of the cell being
a part of an obstacle. These output metrics are listed in Table 2.
Step 3: Post processing. The clustering process only considers
cells with objectness values (one of the output metrics listed in Table
2) greater than a given threshold (0.5 by default). Then, the process
constructs candidate object clusters by building a connected graph
using the cells’ output metrics. Candidate object clusters are then fil-
tered by selecting clusters with average positiveness values (another
output metric) greater than a given threshold (0.1 by default). The
box builder then reconstructs the bounding box including height,
width, length of an obstacle candidate from the 3D point cloud
assigned to it. Finally, the tracker integrates consecutive frames of
processed results to generate tracked obstacles, augmented with
additional information such as speed, acceleration, and turning
rates, as the output of the LiDAR-based perception.
With the information of perceived obstacles such as their po-
sitions, shapes, and obstacle types, the Apollo system then uses
such information to make driving decisions. The perception output
is further processed by the prediction module which predicts the
future trajectories of perceived obstacles, and then the planning
module which plans the future driving routes and makes decisions
such as stopping, lane changing, yielding, etc.
Feature Description
Max height Maximum height of points in the cell.
Max intensity Intensity of the highest point in the cell.
Mean height Mean height of points in the cell.
Mean intensity Mean intensity of points in the cell.
Count Number of points in the cell.
Direction Angle of the cell’s center with respect to the origin.
Distance Distance between the cell’s center and the origin.
Non-empty Binary value indicating whether the cell is empty or occupied.
Table 1: DNN model input features.
Metrics Description
Center offset Offset to the predicted center of the cluster the cell belongs
to.
Objectness The probability of a cell belonging to an obstacle.
Positiveness The confidence score of the detection.
Object height The predicted object height.
Class probability The probability of the cell being a part of a vehicle, pedes-
trian, etc.
Table 2: DNN model output metrics.
2.2 LiDAR Sensor and Spoofing Attacks
To understand the principles underlying our security analysis
methodology, it is necessary to understand how the LiDAR sen-
sor generates a point cloud and how it is possible to alter it in a
controlled way using spoofing attacks.
LiDAR sensor. A LiDAR sensor functions by firing laser pulses
and capturing their reflections using photodiodes. Because the
speed of light is constant, the time it takes for the echo pulses to
reach the receiving photodiode provides an accurate measurement
of the distance between a LiDAR and a potential obstacle. By firing
the laser pulses at many vertical and horizontal angles, a LiDAR
generates a point cloud used by the AV systems to detect objects.
LiDAR spoofing attack. Sensor spoofing attacks use the same
physical channels as the targeted sensor to manipulate the sen-
sor readings. This strategy makes it very difficult for the sensor
system to recognize such attack, since the attack doesn’t require
any physical contact or tampering with the sensor, and it doesn’t
interfere with the processing and transmission of the digital sensor
measurement. These types of attacks could trick the victim sensor
to provide seemingly legitimate, but actually erroneous, data.
LiDAR has been shown to be vulnerable to laser spoofing attacks
in prior work. Petit et al. demonstrated that a LiDAR spoofing
attack can be performed by replaying the LiDAR laser pulses from
a different position to create fake points further than the location of
the spoofer [42]. Shin et al. showed that it is possible to generate a
fake point cloud at different distances, even closer than the spoofer
location [44]. In this paper, we build upon these prior works to study
the effect of this attack vector on the security of AV perception.
2.3 Adversarial Machine Learning
Neural networks. A neural network is a function consisting of
connected units called (artificial) neurons that work together to rep-
resent a differentiable function that outputs a distribution. A given
neural network (e.g., classification) can be defined by its model
architecture and parameters ϕ. An optimizer such as Adam [35]
is used to update the parameters ϕ with respect to the objective
function L.
Adversarial examples. Given a machine learning modelM , in-
put x and its corresponding label y, an adversarial attacker aims
to generate adversarial examples x ′ so thatM(x ′) , y (untargeted
attack) or M(x ′) = y′, where y′ is a target label (targeted attack).
Carlini and Wagner [21] proposed to generate an adversarial per-
turbation for a targeted attack by optimizing an objective function
as follows:
min | |x − x ′ | |p s.t. M(x ′) = y′ and x ′ ∈ X ,
where M(x ′) = y′ is the target adversarial goal and x ′ ∈ X de-
note that the adversarial examples should be in a valid set. Further,
optimization-based algorithms have been leveraged to generate
adversarial examples on various kinds of machine learning tasks
successfully, such as segmentation [26, 53], human pose estima-
tion [26], object detection [53], Visual Question Answer system [54],
image caption translation [24], etc. In this paper, we also leverage
an optimization-based method to generate adversarial examples to
fool LiDAR-based AV perception.
3 ATTACK GOAL AND THREAT MODEL
Attack goal.To cause semantically-impactful security consequences
in AV settings, we set the attack goal as fooling the LiDAR-based
perception into perceiving fake obstacles in front of a victim AV in
order to maliciously alter its driving decisions. More specifically,
in this work, we target front-near fake obstacles, i.e., those that
are in close distances to the front of a victim AV, since they have
the highest potential to trigger immediate erroneous AV driving
decisions. In this work, we define front-near obstacles as those that
are around 5 meters in front of a victim AV.
Threat model. To achieve the attack goal above, we consider Li-
DAR spoofing attacks as our threat model, which is a demonstrated
practical attack vector for LiDAR sensors [42, 44] as described
in §2.2. In AV settings, there are several possible scenarios to per-
form such attack. First, the attacker can place an attacking device
at the roadside to shoot malicious laser pulses to AVs passing by.
Second, the attacker can drive an attack vehicle in close proximity
to the victim AV, e.g., in the same lane or adjacent lanes. To perform
the attack, the attack vehicle is equipped with an attacking device
that shoots laser pulses to the victim AV’s LiDAR. To perform laser
aiming in these scenarios, the attacker can use techniques such as
camera-based object detection and tracking. In AV settings, these
attacks are stealthy since the laser pulses are invisible and laser
shooting devices are relatively small in size.
As a first security analysis, we assume that the attacker has
white-box access to the machine learning model and the perception
system. We consider this threat model reasonable since the attacker
could obtain white-box access by additional engineering efforts to
reverse engineering the software.
4 LIMITATION OF BLIND SENSOR SPOOFING
To understand the security of LiDAR-based perception under Li-
DAR spoofing attacks, we first reproduce the state-of-the-art LiDAR
spoofing attack by Shin et al. [44], and explore the effectiveness of
directly applying it to attack the LiDAR-based perception pipeline
in Baidu Apollo [4], an open-source AV system that has over 100
partners and has reached mass production agreements with multi-
ple partners such as Volvo, Ford, and King Long [8, 9].
Spoofing attack description. The attack by Shin et al. [44]
consists of three components: a photodiode, a delay component,
and an infrared laser, which are shown in Fig. 3. The photodiode
is used to synchronize with the victim LiDAR. The photodiode
triggers the delay component whenever it captures laser pulses
fired from the victim LiDAR. Then the delay component triggers
the attack laser after a certain amount of time to attack the following
firing cycles of the victim LiDAR. Since the firing sequence of laser
pulses is consistent, an adversary can choose which fake points will
appear in the point cloud by crafting a pulse waveform to trigger
the attack laser.
Experimental setup.We perform spoofing attack experiments
on a VLP-16 PUCK LiDAR System from Velodyne [32]. The VLP-16
uses a vertical array of 16 separate laser diodes to fire laser pulses
at different angles. It has a 30 degree vertical angle range from
-15 ◦ to +15 ◦, with 2 ◦ of angular resolution. The VLP-16 rotates
horizontally around a center axis to send pulses in a 360 ◦ horizontal
range, with a varying azimuth resolution between 0.1 ◦ and 0.4 ◦.
The laser firing sequence follows the pattern shown in Figure 4. The
VLP-16 fires 16 laser pulses in a cycle every 55.296 µs, with a period
of 2.304 µs. The receiving time window is about 667 ns. We chose
this sensor because it is compatible with Baidu Apollo and uses
the same design principle as the more advanced HDL-64E LiDARs
used in many AVs. The similar design indicates that the same laser
attacks that affect the VLP-16 can be extended to high-resolution
LiDARs like the HDL-64E.
We use the OSRAM SFH 213 FA as our photodiode, with a com-
parator circuit similar to the one used by Shin et al. We use a Tek-
tronix AFG3251 function generator as the delay component with
the photodiode circuit as an external trigger. In turn, the function
generator provides the trigger to the laser driver module PCO-7114
that drives the attack laser diode OSRAM SPL PL90. With the PCO-
7114 laser driver, we were able to fire the laser pulses at the same
pulse rate of the VLP-16, 2.304 µs, compared to 100 µs of the pre-
vious work. An optical lens with a diameter of 30mm and a focal
length of 100 mm was used to focus the beam, making it more
effective for ranges farther than 5 meters. We generate the custom
pulse waveform using the Tektronix software ArbExpress [2] to
create different shapes and the Velodyne software VeloView [10] to
analyze and extract the point clouds.
Experiment results. The prior work of Shin et al. is able to
spoof a maximum of 10 fake dots in a single horizontal line. With
our setup improvements (a faster firing rate and a lens to focus
the beam), fake points can be generated at all of the 16 vertical
viewing angles and an 8 ◦ horizontal angle at greater than 10 meters
away. In total, around 100 dots can be spoofed by covering these
horizontal and vertical angles (illustrated in Fig. 14 in Appendix).
These spoofed dots can also be shaped by modifying the custom
pulse waveform used to fire the attack laser. Notice that even though
around 100 dots can be spoofed, they are not all spoofed stably.
The attacker is able to spoof points at different angles because the
spoofed laser pulses hit a certain area on the victim LiDAR due to
the optical lens focusing. The closer to the center of the area, the
stronger and stabler laser pulses are received by the victim LiDAR.
We find that among 60 points at the center 8-10 vertical lines can
be stably spoofed with high intensity.
Figure 2: Overview of the Adv-LiDAR methodology.
Figure 3: Illustration of LiDAR spoofing attack. The photo-
diode receives the laser pulses from the LiDAR and activate
the delay component that triggers the attacker laser to sim-
ulate real echo pulses.
Figure 4: The consistent firing sequence of the LiDAR allows
an attacker to choose the angles and distances from which
spoofed points appear. For example, applying the attacker
signal, fake dots will appear at 1◦, 3◦, -3◦, and -1◦ angles (0◦
is the center of the LiDAR)
4.1 Blind LiDAR Spoofing Experiments
After reproducing the LiDAR spoofing attack, we then explore
whether blindly applying such attack can directly generate spoofed
obstacles in the LiDAR-based perception in Baidu Apollo. Since our
LiDAR spoofing experiments are performed in indoor environments,
Figure 5: Generating the attacker-perturbed 3D point cloud
by synthesizing the pristine 3D point cloud with the attack
trace to spoof a front-near obstacle 5 meters away from the
victim AV.
we synthesize the on-road attack effect by adding spoofed LiDAR
points to the original 3D point cloud collected by Baidu Apollo
team on local roads in Sunnyvale, CA. The synthesizing process is
illustrated in Fig. 5. After this process, we run Apollo’s perception
module with the attacker-perturbed 3D point cloud as input to
obtain the object detection output. In this analysis, we explore
three blind attack experiments as follows:
Experiment 1: Directly apply original spoofing attack traces.
In this experiment, we directly replay spoofing attack traces to
attack LiDAR-based perception in Apollo. More specifically, we
experiment with attack traces obtained from two sources: (1) the
original spoofing attack traces from Shin et al. [44], and (2) the
attack traces generated from the spoofing attack reproduced by us,
which can inject more dots after our setup improvements. However,
we are not able to observe a spoofed obstacle for any of these traces
at the output of the LiDAR-based perception pipeline.
Experiment 2: Apply spoofing attack traces at different
angles. To understand whether successfully spoofing an obstacle
depends on the angle of the spoofed points, in this experiment we
inject spoofed points at different locations. More specifically, we
uniformly sample 100 different angles out of 360 degrees around
the victim AV, and inject the spoofing attack traces reproduced by
us. However, we are not able to observe spoofed obstacles for any
of these angles.
Experiment 3: Apply spoofing attack traces with different
shapes. To understand whether successfully spoofing an obstacle
depends on the pattern of the spoofed points, in this experiment we
inject points with different spoofing patterns. More specifically, we
generate random patterns of spoofed points by randomly setting
Figure 6: The point cloud from a real vehicle reflection (left)
and from the spoofing attack (right) in a 64-line HDL-64E
LiDAR. The vehicle is around 7 meters in front of the AV.
distances for each point at different angles. We generate 160 points
covering 16 vertical lines, 10 points for each line with continuous
horizontal angles. To trigger immediate control decision changes
in an AV, the spoofed obstacle needs to be close to the victim AV.
Thus, we set the generated distances of the spoofed point to be
within 4 to 6 meters to the victim AV. We generate 100 different
spoofed patterns in total, but we are not able to observe spoofed
obstacles for any of these patterns.
Summary. In these experiments, we try various blind spoofing
attack strategies directly derived from the state-of-the-art LiDAR
spoofing attack, but none of them succeed in generating spoofed
obstacles in the LiDAR-based perception pipeline in Baidu Apollo.
There are two potential reasons. First, as described earlier, the
current attack methodology can only cover a very narrow spoofing
angle, i.e., 8 ◦ of horizontal angle even after our setup improvements.
Second, the coverage of vertical angles is limited by the frequency
of spoofing laser pulses. Thus, when attacking a LiDAR with more
vertical angles, e.g., a 64-line LiDAR, since a 64-line LiDAR takes
similar time as a 16-line LiDAR in scanning vertical angles, the
attacker cannot spoof more vertical angles than those for a 16-
line LiDAR. Thus, the current methodology limits the number of
spoofed points, making it hard to generate enough points to mimic
an important road obstacle.
To illustrate that, as shown in Fig. 6, the point cloud for a real
vehicle has a much wider angle and many more points than the
attack traces reproduced by us. Thus, blindly applying the spoofing
attack cannot easily fool the machine learning based object detec-
tion process in the LiDAR-based perception pipeline. In the next
section, we explore the possibility of further exploiting machine
learning model vulnerabilities to achieve our attack goal.
5 IMPROVED METHODOLOGY: ADV-LIDAR
As discussed in §4, without considering the machine learning model
used in LiDAR-based perception, blindly applying existing LiDAR
spoofing attacks can hardly achieve the attack goal of generating
front-near obstacles. Since it is known that machine learning output
can be maliciously altered by carefully-crafted perturbations to the
input [18, 20, 29, 41, 57], we are then motivated to explore the
possibility of strategically controlling the spoofed points to fool
the machine learning model in LiDAR-based perception. In this
section, we first describe the technical challenges after involving
adversarial machine learning analysis in this research problem, and
then present our solution methodology overview, calledAdv-LiDAR.
5.1 Technical Challenges
Even though previous studies have shown promising results in
attacking machine learning models, none of them studied LiDAR-
based object detection models, and their approaches have limited
applicability to our analysis goal due to three challenges:
First, attackers have limited capability of perturbing machine
learning model inputs in our problem. Other than perturbing pixels
on an image, perturbing machine learning inputs under AV settings
requires perturbing 3D point cloud raw data by sensor attack and
bypassing the associated pre-processing process. Therefore, such
perturbation capability needs to be quantified and modeled.
Second, optimization-based methods for generating adversarial
examples in previous studies may not be directly suitable for our
analysis problem due to the limited model input perturbation capa-
bility. As shown in §7, we find that optimization-based methods are
inherently limited due to the nature of our problem, and can only
achieve very low success rate in generating front-near obstacles.
Third, in our problem, successfully changing the machine learn-
ingmodel output does not directly lead to successes in achieving our
attack goal in AV settings. As detailed later in §7, in AV systems such
as Baidu Apollo, machine learning model output is post-processed
before it is converted to a list of perceived obstacles. Thus, an ob-
jective function that can effectively reflect our attack goal needs to
be newly designed.
5.2 Adv-LiDAR Methodology Overview
In this section, we provide an overview of our solutionmethodology,
whichwe call Adv-LiDAR, that addresses the three challenges above.
At a high level, to identify adversarial examples for the machine
learningmodelM , we adopt an optimization-based approach, which
has shown both high efficiency and effectiveness by previous studies
for machine learning models across different domains [21, 26, 51,
52]. To help explain the formulation of the optimization problem,
we summarize the notations in Table 3. Specifically, the problem is
formulated as follows:
min Ladv(x ⊕ t ′;M)
s.t. t ′ ∈ {Φ(T ′)|T ′ ∈ A} & x = Φ(X ) (1)
where X is the pristine 3D point cloud and x represents the corre-
sponding 2D input feature matrix. Φ(·) is the pre-processing func-
tion that maps X into x (§2.1). T ′ and t ′ are the corresponding
adversarial spoofed 3D point cloud and adversarial spoofed input
feature matrix.A is a set of spoofed 3D point cloud generated from
LiDAR spoofing attacks. Ladv(·;M) is the adversarial loss designed
to achieve the adversarial goal given the machine learning modelM .
The constraints are used to guarantee that the generated adversarial
examples t ′ satisfy the spoofing attack capability.
Figure 2 overviews the analysis tasks needed to solve the opti-
mization problem. First, we need to conduct an input perturbation
analysis that formulates the spoofing attack capabilities A and
merging function ⊕. Second, we need to perform a model analysis
to design an objective function to generate adversarial examples.
Third, as a case study to understand the impact of the attacks at the
Notation Description Notation Description
X 3D point cloud x Input feature matrix
X ′ Adversarial 3D point cloud x ′ Adversarial input feature matrix
T Spoofed 3D point cloud t Spoofed input feature matrix
T ′ Adversarial spoofed 3D point cloud t ′ Adversarial spoofed input feature matrix
(wx, wy, wx) 3D Cartesian coordinate Lθ , Lτ Upper bound of θ, τ during sampling
(u, v) Coordinate of t (u′, v ′) Coordinate of t ′
M Machine learning model I· Model outputs
N (u, v) 4-pixel neighbor at the location (u, v) S (·) Height Scaling function
A Spoofing attack capability Φ(·) Mapping function (3D→ 2D)
Q (M, ·) Extraction function ⊕(·) Merge function
M(·) Gaussian mask (px, py) Center points of the Gaussian mask
f (·) Objective function Ladv(·) Adversarial loss
H (θ, τ , ϵ ) 2D Homography Matrix (θ : rotation, ϵ : scaling ; τ : translation ) Sh Height scaling ratio
ST Set of spoofed 3D point cloud St Set of spoofed input feature matrix
GT (T , ·) Global spatial transformation function for 3D point cloud Gt (t, ·) Global spatial transformation function for input feature matrix
Table 3: Notations adopted in this work.
AV driving decision level, we further perform a driving decision
analysis using the identified adversarial examples. More details
about these tasks are as follows:
Input perturbation analysis. Formulating A and ⊕ is non-
trivial. First, previous work regarding LiDAR spoofing attacks nei-
ther provided detailed measurements on the attacker’s capability
in perturbing 3D point cloud nor expressed it in a closed form ex-
pression. Second, point cloud data is pre-processed by several steps
as shown in Section 2.1 before turning into machine learning input,
which means the merging function ⊕ cannot be directly expressed.
To address these two challenges, as will be detailed later in §6, we
first conduct spoofing attacks on LiDAR to collect a set of possible
spoofed 3D point cloud. Using such spoofed 3D point cloud, we
model the spoofing attack capability A. We further analyze the
pre-processing program to obtain the additional constraints to the
machine learning input perturbation, or the spoofed input feature
matrix. Based on this analysis, we formulate the spoofed input
feature matrix into a differentiable function using global spatial
transformations, which is required for the model analysis.
Objective function design and model analysis. As intro-
duced earlier in §5.1, in LiDAR-based perception in AV systems,
the machine learning model output is post-processed (§ 2.1) before
turning into a list of perceived obstacles. To find an effective ob-
jective function, we study the post-processing steps to extract key
strategies of transforming model output into perceived obstacles,
and formulate it into an objective function that reflects the attack
goal. In addition, we find that our optimization problem cannot
be effectively solved by directly using existing optimization-based
methods. We analyze the loss surface, and find that this inefficiency
is caused by the problem nature. To address this challenge, we
improve the methodology by combining global sampling with opti-
mization. Details about the analysis methodology and results are
in §7 and § 8.
Driving decision case study.With the results from previous
analysis steps, we can generate adversarial 3D point cloud that
can inject spoofed obstacles at the LiDAR-based perception level.
To understand their impact at the AV driving decision level, we
construct and evaluate two attack scenarios as case studies. The
evaluation methodology and results are detailed later in §9.
6 INPUT PERTURBATION ANALYSIS
To generate adversarial examples by solving the above optimization
problem in Equation 1, we need to formulate merging function ⊕
and input feature matrix spoofing capability Φ(A) as a closed form.
In this section, we first analyze the spoofing attack capability (A),
and then use it to formulate Φ(A).
6.1 Spoofing Attack Capability
Based on the attack reproduction experiments in §4, the observed
attack capability (A) can be described from two aspects:
Number of spoofed points. As described in §4, even though it
is possible to spoof around 100 points after our setup improvement,
we find that around 60 points can be reliably spoofed in our ex-
periments. Thus, we consider 60 as the highest number of reliable
spoofed points. Noticed that, the maximum number of spoofed
points could be increased if the attacker uses more advanced attack
equipment. Here, we choose a set of devices that are more acces-
sible (detailed in §4) and end up with the ability to reliably spoof
around 60 points. In addition, considering that an attacker may use
a slower laser or cruder focusing optics, such as in the setup by
Shin et al. [44], we also consider 20 and 40 spoofed points in our
analysis.
Location of spoofed points. Given the number of spoofed
points, the observed attack capability in placing these points are
described and modeled as follows:
(1) Modify the distance of the spoofed point from the LiDAR
by changing the delay of the attack laser signal pulses in
small intervals (nanosecond scale). From the perspective of
spoofed 3D point cloudT , this can be modeled as moving the
position of the spoofed points nearer or further on the axis
r that connects the spoofed points and the LiDAR sensor by
distance ∆r (Fig. 7 (a)).
(2) Modify the altitude of a spoofed point within the vertical
range of the LiDAR by changing the delay in intervals of
2.304 µs . From the perspective of spoofed 3D point cloud T ,
this can be modeled as moving the position of the spoofed
points from vertical line to vertical line to change the height
of it by height ∆h (Fig. 7 (b)).
(3) Modify the azimuth of a spoofed point within a horizontal
viewing angle of 8◦ by changing the delay in intervals of
55.296 µs . Bymoving the LiDAR spoofer to different locations
Figure 7: Attack capability in perturbing 3D Point Cloud T
around the LiDAR, it is possible to spoof at any horizontal
angle. From the perspective of spoofed 3D point cloud T ,
this can be modeled as rotating the spoofed points with the
LiDAR sensor as the pivot point on the horizontal plane by
angle ∆θ (Fig. 7 (c)).
Therefore, we model the attack capability A by applying these
three modifications to the given spoofed 3D point cloud T . Here
the spoofed 3D point cloud is collected by reproducing the sensor
spoofing attack. The point number of T can be 20, 40 and 60 to
represent different attack capabilities as mentioned before. In the
next section, the attack capabilityA modeled here is used to model
the perturbation of the input feature matrix x .
6.2 Input Perturbation Modeling
After analyzing spoofing attack capabilityA, to formulate x ⊕ t ′ in
Equation 1, We need to have the following steps: (1) formulating the
merging function ⊕; (2) modeling the spoofed input feature matrix
spoofing capability Φ(A) based on known spoofing attack capabil-
ityA. In this section, we first formulate the merging function ⊕ by
analyzing the pre-processing program. Then we model the spoofed
input feature matrix spoofing capability Φ(A) by expressing t ′ with
spoofed input feature matrix t in a differentiable function using
global spatial transformations. Here, spoofed input feature matrix t
can be attained with a given spoofed 3D point cloud T by t = Φ(T ).
Formulating merging function (⊕). To model the merging
function ⊕ operated on x and t ′, which are in the domain of input
feature matrix, we need to first analyze the pre-processing program
Φ(·) that transforms the 3D point cloud X into the input feature
matrix x . As described in §2.1, the pre-processing process consists
of three sub-processes: coordinate transformation, ROI filtering and
input feature matrix extraction. The first two processes make minor
effects on the adversarial spoofed 3D point cloud T ′ generated by
the spoofing attack we conducted in §6. The coordinate transforma-
tion process has no effect because the adversarial spoofed 3D point
cloud T ′ will be transformed along with the 3D point cloud X. As
for the ROI filtering process, it filters out 3D point cloud located
outside of the road from a bird’s-eye view. Therefore, as long as we
spoof points on the road, the ROI filtering process makes no effect
on the adversarial spoofed 3D point cloudT ′. The feature extraction
process, as we mentioned in Section 2.1, extracts statistical features
such as average height (Iavд_h ), average intensity (Iavд_int ), max
height (Imax_h ) and so on.
Because of such pre-processing, the spoofed input feature matrix
t ′ cannot be directly added to the input feature matrix x to attain
the adversarial input feature matrix x ′. To attain x ′, we express such
“addition” operation (⊕) as a differentiable function shown below.
Note that in this equation we do not include a few features in Table 1
such as direction and distance since they are either constant or can
be derived directly from the features included in the equation.
x ′ = x
⊕
t ′
=

Ixcnt + I
t ′
cnt
(Ixavд_h · Ixcnt + I t
′
avд_h · I t
′
cnt )/(Ixcnt + I t
′
cnt )
max(Ixmax_h , I t
′
max_h )
(Ixavд_int · Ixcnt + I t
′
avд_int · I t
′
cnt )/(Ixcnt + I t
′
cnt )∑
Ixmax_int · 1{Ixmax_h =max{Ixmax_h , I t
′
max_h }}

(2)
Modeling input feature matrix spoofing capability Φ(A).
To model input feature matrix spoofing capability Φ(A), it equals
to representing adversarial input feature matrix t ′ with known
spoofed input feature matrix t . We can use global spatial transfor-
mations including rotation, translation and scaling, under certain
constraints to represent the input feature matrix spoofing capability.
Here the translation and scaling transformation interprets the at-
tack capability in terms of modifying the azimuth of 3D point cloud
while the rotation transformation interprets the attack capability in
terms of modifying the distance of 3D point cloud from the LiDAR.
Specifically, we apply the global spatial transformation to a set
of the spoofed input feature matrix St to formulate the spoofed
input feature matrix spoofing capability Φ(A) and to represent
adversarial spoofed input feature matrix t’. For each spoofed input
feature matrix t ∈ St, it is mapped from a corresponding spoofed
3D point cloud T such that t = Φ(T ).
We use t ′(i) to denote values of the i-th position on the spoofed
input feature matrix t ′ and 2D coordinate (u′(i),v
′
(i)) to denote its
location. t ′ is transformed from an arbitrary instance t where t ∈ St
by applying a homography matrix H (θ ,τ , ϵ). The location of t(i)
can be derived as t ′(i) as follows:
(u(i),v(i), 1)T = H · (u
′
(i),v
′
(i), 1)T ,
w.r.t. H =

ϵ(cosθ − sinθ ) τx
ϵ(sinθ cosθ ) τy
0 0 1

(3)
Notice that here, τx /τy has a fixed ratio tanθ since the translation is
performed along the r axis shown in Fig. 7 (1). Since θ is dependent
on the spoofed input feature matrix we provide for performing
the transformation, we align the spoofed input feature matrix in
advance to the x axis where θ = 0 and accordingly τy = τx tanθ = 0.
Therefore, we can optimize τx alone. Also, this process is equivalent
to scaling so we remove ϵ .
We use the differentiable bilinear interpolation [34] to calculate
t ′(i):
t ′(i) =
∑
q∈N(u(i ),v(i ))
t(q)(1 − |u(i) − u(q) |)(1 − |v(i) −v(q) |), (4)
where N(u(i),v(i)) represents the 4-pixel neighbors (top-left, top-
right,bottom-left, bottom-right) at the location (u(i),v(i)) .
Further, we can observe that the input feature matrix contains
the height information as shown in Table 1. So we also optimize
a global scale scalar sh to the height features when generating
adversarial spoofed input feature matrix t ′. Define S(t , sh ) as the
scaling function that multiplies the features which contain the
height information by sh . Based on this transformation, Equation 4
will be changed as follows. For simplification, we denote the whole
transformation progress as Gt . So Gt (θ ,τx , sh ; t) represents the
transformed adversarial spoofed input feature matrixgiven spoofed
input feature matrix t with transformation parameters θ ,τx , sh .
t ′(i) = Gt (i)(θ ,τx , sh ; t)
=
∑
q∈N(u(i ),v(i ))
S(t(q), sh )(1 − |u(i) − u(q) |)(1 − |v(i) −v(q) |)
(5)
7 GENERATING ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
After modeling the input perturbation, in this section we design
the objective function with an effective adversarial loss Ladv, and
leverage an optimization method to find the attack transformation
parameters that minimize such loss.
Design the adversarial loss Ladv. Unlike previous work that
performs the analysis only at the machine learning model level,
there is no obvious objective function reflecting our attack goal of
spoofing front-near obstacles. Yet, creating an effective objective
function has been shown to be essential in generating effective
adversarial examples [21]. In order to design an effective objective
function, we analyze the post-processing step for the machine
learning output. As shown in §2.1, in the clustering process, each
cell of the model output is filtered by its objectness value. After
the clustering process, candidate object clusters are filtered by
their positiveness values. Upon such observation, we designed the
adversarial loss Ladv as follows,
Ladv =
∑(1 −Q(x ′, positiveness)Q(x ′, objectness))M(px ,py)
(6)
where Q(x ′, ·) is the function to extract the probabilities of · at-
tribute from modelM by feeding in adversarial example x ′.M is a
standard Gaussian mask with center coordinate (px ,py) which is
an attack target position chosen by the attacker. We attain (px ,py)
by mapping the attack target position in the real world onto the
corresponding coordinates of the cell in the input feature matrix
using Φ. The adversarial loss is then the summation over all the
cells in the input feature matrix of the weighted value described
above. By minimizing this designed adversarial loss, it equals to
increasing the probability to detect the obstacle of the adversarial
spoofed 3D point cloud given the machine learning modelM .
Optimization algorithm and our improvement using sam-
pling.With the Ladv design above, the optimization problem can
be directly solved by using the Adam optimizer [35] to obtain the
transformation parameters θ ,τx and scalar sh by minimizing the
following objective function:
f = argminθ,τx ,sh
∑(1 −Q(x ′, positiveness)Q(x ′, objectness))M(px ,py)
(7)
where t ′ can be obtained by Equation 5 and x ′ = x ⊕ t ′. In this
paper, we call this direct solution vanilla optimization.
We visualize the loss surface against the transformation parame-
ters in Fig. 9. During the vanilla optimization process, we observe
that the loss surface over the transformation parameters is noisy at
a small scale (green line) and quite flat at a large scale (red line). This
leads to the problem of choosing a proper step size for optimization-
based methods. For example, choosing a small step size will trap the
optimizing process near a local minimum while choosing a large
step size will be less effective due to noisy local loss pointing to
the wrong direction. Different from Carlini et al. [21] that directly
chose multiple starting points to reduces the trap of local minima,
the optimization process in our setting is easy to get stuck in bad
local minima due to the hard constraints of the perturbations. We
propose a way to use sampling at a larger scale and to optimize
at a smaller scale. To initiate the optimization process at different
positions, we first calculate the range of the transformation param-
eters so that the transformed spoofed 3D point cloud is located in
the target area. Then we uniformly take n samples for rotation and
translation parameters and create n2 samples to initiate with.
Generating adversarial spoofed 3D point cloud. To further
construct the adversarial 3D point cloud X ′, we need to construct
adversarial spoofed 3D point cloud T ′. Using the transformation
parameters θ ,τ , ϵ, sh , we can express the corresponding adversarial
spoofed 3D point cloud T ′ such that t ′ = Φ(T ′) with a dual trans-
formation functionGT ofGt . We useTwx ,Twy ,Twz to denote value
of coordinate (wx,wy,wz) and Ti to denote the value of intensity
for all points in spoofed 3D point cloud T . With transformation pa-
rameters θ ,τ , ϵ, sh , we can expressT ′wx ,T
′
wy ,T
′
wz of the transformed
adversarial spoofed 3D point cloud T ′ in Equation 8.
T ′i = Ti
T ′wx
T ′wy
T ′wz
1
 =

cosθ − sinθ 0 τx
sinθ cosθ 0 0
0 0 sh 0
0 0 0 1
 ·

Twx
Twy
Twz
1

(8)
Therefore, we can use T ′ = GT (θ ,τx , sh ;T ) represents the trans-
formed adversarial spoofed 3D point cloud given spoofed 3D point
cloud T with transformation parameters θ ,τx , sh .
Overall adversarial example generation process. Fig. 8 pro-
vides an overview of the overall adversarial example generation
process. Given 3D point cloud X and spoofed 3D point cloud T
(Fig. 8 (a)), we first map them via Φ to get corresponding input
feature matrix x and spoofed input feature matrix t . Then we apply
the sampling algorithm to initialize the transformation parameters
θ ,τx , sh as shown in Fig. 8 (b). After the initialization, we leverage
optimizer opt to further optimize the transformation parameters
(θ ,τx , sh ) with respect to the adversarial loss function Ladv (Fig. 8
(c)). With the transformation parameters θ ,τx , sh and T , we apply
the dual transformation function GT using the Equation 8 to get
adversarial spoofed 3D point cloud T ′. At last, to obtain the adver-
sarial 3D point cloud X ′, we append T ′ to 3D point cloud X (Fig. 8
(d)). The entire adversarial example generation algorithm including
the optimization parameters is detailed in Appendix A.
Figure 8: Overview of the adversarial example generation process.
Figure 9: Loss surface over transformation parameters θ (ro-
tation) and τx (translation). Using a small step size (green
line) will trap the optimizing process near a local extreme
while choosing a large step size (red line) will be less effec-
tive.
8 EVALUATION AND RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate our adversarial example generation
method in terms of attack effectiveness and robustness.
Experiment Setup.We use the real-world LiDAR sensor data
trace released by Baidu Apollo team with Velodyne HDL-64E S3,
which is collected for 30 seconds on local roads at Sunnyvale, CA.
We uniformly sample 300 3D point cloud frames from this trace in
our evaluation. The attack goal is set as spoofing an obstacle that is
2-8 meters to the front of the victim AV. The distance is measured
from the front end of the victim AV to the rear end of the obstacle.
8.1 Attack Effectiveness
Fig. 10 shows the success rates of generating a spoofed obstacle
with different attack capabilities using the vanilla optimization and
our improved optimization with global sampling (detailed in §7). As
shown, with our improvement using sampling, the success rates of
spoofing front-near obstacles are increased from 18.9% to 43.3% on
average, which is a 2.65× improvement. This shows that combining
global sampling with optimization is effective in addressing the
problem of becoming trapped in local minima described in §7.
Figure 10: Attack success rate of spoofing a front-near obsta-
cle with different number of spoofed points. V-opt refers to
vanilla optimization which is directly using the optimizer
and S-opt refers to sampling based optimization. We choose
Adam [35] as the optimizer in both cases.
Fig. 10 also shows that the success rates increase with more
spoofed points, which is expected since the attack capability is
increased withmore spoofed points. In particular, when the attacker
can reliably inject 60 spoofed points, which is the attack capability
observed in our experiments (§4), the attack is able to achieve
around 75% success rate using our improved optimization method.
In addition, we observe that the spoofed obstacles in all of the
successful attacks are classified as vehicles after the LiDAR-based
perception process, even though we do not specifically aim at spoof-
ing vehicle-type obstacles in our problem formulation.
8.2 Robustness Analysis
In this section, we perform analysis to understand the robustness of
the generated adversarial spoofed 3D point cloudT ′ to variations in
3D point cloudX and spoofed 3D point cloudT ∈ ST. Such analysis
is meaningful for generating adversarial spoofed 3D point cloud
that has high attack success rate in the real world. To launch the
Figure 11: The robustness of the generated adversarial
spoofed 3D point cloud to variations in 3D point cloud X .
We quantify the variation in 3D point cloud X as the frame
indexes difference between the evaluated 3D point cloud
and the 3D point cloud used for generating the adversarial
spoofed 3D point cloud.
attack in the real world, there are two main variations that affect
the results: variation in spoofed points and variation in positions of
the victim AV. 1) The imprecision in the attack devices contributes
to the variation of the spoofed points. The attacker is able to stably
spoof 60 points at a global position as we state in §2.2. However, it
is difficult to spoof points with precise positions. It is important to
understand whether such imprecision affects the attack success rate.
2) The position of the victim AV is not controlled by the attacker
and might vary from where the attacker collected the 3D point
cloud. It is important to understand whether such difference affects
the attack success rate.
Robustness to variations in point cloud. To measure the ro-
bustness to variations in the 3D point cloud, we first select all the 3D
point cloud frames that can generate successful adversarial spoofed
3D point cloud. For each of them, we apply its generated adversarial
spoofed 3D point cloud to 15 consecutive frames (around 1.5 s) after
it and calculate the success rates. Fig. 11 shows the analysis results.
In this figure, the x-axis is the index for the 15 consecutive frames,
and thus the larger the frame index is, the larger the variation is
from the original 3D point cloud that generates the adversarial
spoofed 3D point cloud. As shown, the robustness for attacks with
more spoofed points is generally higher than that for attacks with
fewer spoofed points, which shows that higher attack capability
can increase the robustness. Particularly, with 60 spoofed points,
the success rates are on average above 75% during the 15 subse-
quent frames, which demonstrates a high degree of robustness. This
suggests that launching such attack does not necessarily require
the victim AV to be located at the exact position that generates the
adversarial example in order to have high success rates.
Robustness to variations in spoofed 3D point cloud. To
evaluate the robustness to variations in the spoofed 3D point cloud,
for a given spoofed 3D point cloud T ∈ ST, we first generate the
corresponding adversarial spoofed 3D point cloud T ′ with a 3D
point cloud X . Next, we generate 5 more spoofed 3D point cloud
Targeted position # Spoofed points
20 40 60
2-8 meters 87% 82% 90%
Table 4: Robustness analysis results of generated adversar-
ial spoofed 3D point cloud to variation in spoofed 3D point
cloud T ∈ ST. The robustness is measured by average attack
success rates.
traces T1, ...,T5 using our LiDAR spoofing attack experiment setup.
Next, we use the same transformation that generates T ′ from T to
generateT ′1 , ...,T
′
5 , and then combine each of themwithX to launch
the attack. Table 4 shows the average success rates with different
attack capabilities. As shown, for all three attack capabilities we are
able to achieve over 82% success rates. With 60 spoofed points, the
success rate is as high as 90%. This suggests that launching such
attack does not require the LiDAR spoofing attack to be precise all
the time in order to achieve high success rates.
9 DRIVING DECISION CASE STUDY
To understand the impact of our attacks at the driving decision level,
in this section we construct two attack scenarios and evaluate them
on Baidu Apollo using their simulation features as case studies.
Experiment setup.We perform the case study using the simu-
lation feature provided by Baidu Apollo, called Sim-control, which
is designed to allow users to observe the AV system behavior at the
driving decision level by replaying collected real-world sensor data
traces. Sim-control does not consist of a physics engine to simu-
late the control of the vehicle. Instead, the AV behaves exactly the
same as what it plans. Although it cannot directly reflect the attack
consequences in the physical world, it can serve for our purpose of
understanding the impact of our attacks on AV driving decisions.
For each attack scenario in the case study, we simulate it in
Sim-control using synthesized continuous frames of successful ad-
versarial 3D point cloud identified in § 8 as input. The experiments
are performed on Baidu Apollo 3.0.
Case study results.We construct and evaluate two attack sce-
narios in this case study1:
(1) Emergency brake attack. In this attack, we generate adver-
sarial 3D point cloud that spoofs a front-near obstacle to a moving
victim AV. We find that the AV makes a stop decision upon this
attack. As illustrated in Fig. 12, the stop decision triggered by a
spoofed front-near obstacle causes the victim AV to decrease its
speed from 43 km/h to 0 km/h within 1 second. This stop decision
will lead to a hard brake [1], which may hurt the passengers or
result in rear-end collisions. Noticed that, Apollo does implement
driving decisions for overtaking. However, for overtaking, a mini-
mum distance is required based on the relative speed of the obstacle.
Therefore, with our near spoofed obstacle, the victim AV makes
stop decisions instead of overtaking decisions.
(2) AV freezing attack. In this attack, we generate an adversarial
3D point cloud that spoofs an obstacle in front of an AV victimwhen
it is waiting at a red traffic light. We simulate this scenario with the
data trace at an intersection with a traffic light. As shown in Fig. 13,
since the victim AV is static, the attacker can constantly attack and
1Video demos can be found at http://tinyurl.com/advlidar
Figure 12: Demonstration of the emergency brake attack. Due to the spoofed ob-
stacle, the victimAVmakes a sudden stop decision to drop its speed from43 km/h
to 0 km/h within a second, which may cause injuries of passengers or rear-end
collisions.
Figure 13: Demonstration of the AV freez-
ing attack. The traffic light is turned green
but the victim AV is not moving due to the
spoofed front-near obstacles.
prevent it from moving even after the traffic signal turns green,
which may be exploited to cause traffic jams. Noticed that, Apollo
does implement driving decisions for deviating static obstacles.
However, for deviation or side passing, it requires a minimum
distance (15 meters by default). Therefore, with our near spoofed
obstacle, the victim AV makes stop decisions instead of side passing
decisions.
10 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the limitations and generality of this
study. We then discuss potential defense directions.
10.1 Limitations and Future Work
Limitations in the sensor attack. One major limitation is that
our current results cannot directly demonstrate attack performance
and practicality in the real world. For example, performing our
attack on a real AV on the road requires dynamically aiming an
attack device at the LiDAR on a victim car with high precision,
which is difficult to prove the feasibility without road tests in the
physical world. In this work, our goal is to provide new understand-
ings of this research problem. Future research directions include
conducting real world testing. To demonstrate the attack in the real
world, we plan to first conduct the sensor attack with LiDAR on
top of a real vehicle in outdoor settings. In this setting, the sensor
attack could be enhanced by: 1) enlarging the laser spoofing area
to solve the aiming problem; 2) adjusting the delay time so that
the attacker could spoof points at different angles without moving
the attack devices. Then we could apply our proposed methodol-
ogy to conduct drive-by experiments in different attack scenarios
mentioned in §9.
Limitations in adversarial example generation. First, we
construct adversarial sensor data by using a subset of spoofing
attack capabilityA. Therefore, our analysis may not fully reveal the
full potential of sensor attacks. Second, though we have performed
the driving decision case study, we did not perform a comprehensive
analysis on modules beyond the perception module. That means
that the designed objective function can be further improved to
more directly target specific abnormal AV driving decisions.
10.2 Generality on LiDAR-based AV Perception
Generality of the methodology. Attacking any LiDAR-based AV
perception system with an adversarial sensor attack can be formu-
lated as three components: (1) formulating the spoofed 3D point
cloud capability A, (2) generating adversarial examples, and (3)
evaluating at the driving decision level. Even though our construc-
tion of these components might be specific to Baidu Apollo, our
analysis methodology can be generalized to other LiDAR-based AV
perception systems.
Generality of the results. The formulation of 3D point cloud
spoofing capability A can be generalized as it is independent from
AV systems. The success of the attack may be extended to other
LiDAR-based AV perception system due to the nature of the LiDAR
sensor attack. The LiDAR spoofing attack introduces a spoofed
3D point cloud, which was not foreseen in the training process
of machine learning models used in the AV perception system.
Therefore, other models are also likely to be vulnerable to such
spoofing patterns.
10.3 Defense Discussion
This section discusses defense directions at AV system, sensor, and
machine learning model levels.
10.3.1 AV System-Level defenses. In our proposed attack, the at-
tacker only needs to inject at most 60 points to spoof an obstacle,
but the 3D point cloud of a detected real vehicle can have as many
as a thousand points (can be illustrated in Fig. 6). We look into the
point cloud of a detected spoofed obstacle and find that the 3D point
cloud consists of points reflected from the ground, in addition to the
points spoofed by the attacker. For example, one of the successful
adversarial spoofed 3D point cloud we generated with 20 spoofed
points is detected as an obstacle containing 283 points.
Points from ground reflection are clustered into obstacles due to
the information loss introduced in the pre-processing phase. More
specifically, mapping a 3D point cloud into a 2D matrix results in
height information loss. This vulnerability contributes to the suc-
cess of the proposed attack. To mitigate the impacts of this problem,
we propose two defenses at the AV system level: (1) filtering out
the ground reflection in the pre-processing phase, and (2) either
avoiding transforming 3D point cloud into input feature matrix or
adding more features to reduce the information loss.
10.3.2 Sensor-Level Defenses. Several defenses could be adopted
against spoofing attacks on LiDAR sensors:
Detection techniques. Sensor fusion, which intelligently com-
bines data from several sensors to detect anomalies and improve
performance, could be adopted against LiDAR spoofing attacks. AV
systems are often equipped with sensors beyond LiDAR. Cameras,
radars, and ultrasonic sensors provide additional information and
redundancy to detect and handle an attack on LiDAR.
Different sensor fusion algorithms have been proposed focusing
on the security and safety aspects [56] [33]. However, the sensor
fusion defense requires the majority of sensors to be functioning
correctly. While not a perfect defense, sensor fusion approaches
can significantly increase the effort of an attacker.
Mitigation techniques. Another class of defenses aims to re-
duce the influence of the attack by modifying the internal sensing
structure of the LiDAR. Different solutions include reducing the re-
ceiving angle and filtering unwanted light spectra to make LiDARs
less susceptible to attacks [42, 44]. However, these techniques also
reduce the capacity of the LiDAR to measure the reflected laser
pulses, which limits the range and the sensitivity of the device.
Randomization techniques. Another defense is adding ran-
domness to how the LiDAR fires laser pulses. The attacker cannot
know when to and what laser pulses to fire if the LiDAR fires laser
pulses with an unpredictable pattern. A solution could be firing a
random grouping of laser pulses each cycle. An attacker would not
know which reflections the LiDAR would be expecting. Another
alternative would be randomizing the laser pulses waveform. With
sensitive equipment, it would be possible to only accept reflection
waveforms that match randomized patterns uniquely produced
by the LiDAR laser. Another solution, proposed by Shoukry et al.
[46], consists of randomly turning off the transmitter to verify with
the receiver if there are any unexpected incoming signals. Adding
randomness makes it difficult for an attacker to influence the mea-
surements, but this approach also adds significant complexity to
the overall system and trades off with performance.
10.3.3 Machine Learning Model-Level Defense. Various detection
and defense methods have also been explored [16, 19, 38, 39] against
adversarial examples in image classification. Adversarial train-
ing [31] and its variations [39, 47] are more successful to improve
the robustness of the model. Motivated by the adversarial examples
generated by our algorithm, we can combine them with the original
training data to conduct adversarial retraining and thus improve
the model robustness.
11 RELATEDWORK
Vehicle systems security. Numerous previous works explore se-
curity problems in vehicle systems and have uncovered vulnera-
bilities in in-vehicle networks of modern automobiles [22, 25, 36],
infotainment systems [40], and emerging connected vehicle-based
systems [23, 30, 48]. In comparison, our work focuses on vehicle
systems with the emerging autonomous driving technology and
specifically targets the security of LiDAR-based AV perception,
which is an attack surface not presented in traditional vehicle sys-
tems designed for human drivers.
Vehicle-related sensor attacks. The sensors commonly used
in traditional vehicles have been shown to be vulnerable to attacks.
Rouf et al. showed that tire pressure sensors are vulnerable to wire-
less jamming and spoofing attacks [43]. Shoukry et al. attacked
the anti-lock braking system of a vehicle by spoofing the magnetic
wheel speed sensor [45]. As AVs become popular, so have attacks
against their perception sensors. Yan et al. used spoofing and jam-
ming attacks to attack the ultrasonic sensors, radar, and camera on
a Tesla Model S [55]. There have also been two works exploring the
vulnerability of LiDAR to spoofing and jamming attacks [42, 44]. In
this work, we build on these prior work to show that LiDAR spoof-
ing attacks can be used to attack the machine learning models used
for LiDAR-based AV perception and affect the driving decision.
Adversarial example generation. Adversarial examples have
been heavily explored in the image domain [21, 31, 41, 52]. Xie
et al. [53] generated adversarial examples for segmentation and
object detection while Cisse et al. [26] for segmentation and human
pose estimation. Researchers also apply adversarial examples to
the physical world to fool machine learning models [17, 27, 28].
Compared to these previous work exploring adversarial examples
in the image domain, this work explores adversarial examples for
LiDAR-based perception. An ongoing work [49] studies the gener-
ation of 3D adversarial point clouds. However, such attack focuses
on the digital domain and can not be directly applied to the context
of AV systems. In comparison, our method is motivated to generate
adversarial examples based on the capability of sensor attacks to
fool the LiDAR-based perception models in AV systems.
12 CONCLUSION
In this work, we perform the first security study of LiDAR-based
perception in AV systems. We consider LiDAR spoofing attacks
as the threat model, and set the attack goal as spoofing front-near
obstacles. We first reproduce the state-of-the-art LiDAR spoofing
attack, and find that blindly applying it is insufficient to achieve the
attack goal due to the machine learning-based object detection pro-
cess. We thus perform analysis to fool the machine learning model
by formulating the attack task as an optimization problem. We first
construct the input perturbation function using local attack experi-
ments and global spatial transformation-based modeling, and then
construct the objective function by studying the post-processing
process. We also identify the inherent limitations of directly us-
ing optimization-based methods and design a new algorithm that
increases the attack success rates by 2.65× on average. As a case
study, we further construct and evaluate two attack scenarios that
may compromise AV safety and mobility. We also discuss defense
directions at AV system, sensor, and machine learning model levels.
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APPENDIX
A ALGORITHM DETAILS AND EXPERIMENT
SETTINGS
Algorithm 1 shows the detailed algorithm to generate adversar-
ial examples. In our experiment, we selected Adam [35] as our
optimizer opt with learning rate 1e − 4. opt(ladv;θ ,τx , sh ) means
updating the parameters θ ,τx , sh ) with respect to Loss function
ladv. We selected TensorFlow [15] as our backbone. Lt is set as 12.5
while Lθ is set as the angle that generates 2-meter distance from
the target position.
Figure 14: Collected traces from the reproduced sensor at-
tack. The points in the yellow circle are spoofed by the sen-
sor attack.
Algorithm 1: Generating adversarial examples by leveraging
global spatial transformation
1
input: Target model:M ;
3D point cloud X ;
3D spoofed 3D point cloudT ;
Optimizer opt ;
Max iteration N ;
output: 3D adversarial 3D point cloud X ′;
2 Initialization: θ ← 0, τx ← 0, sh ← 1, lmin = +inf ,
x = Φ(X ), t = Φ(T );
/* Initiate parameters by sampling around the
transformation parameters Tarдetθ , Tarдetτx that
transforms t to the target position (px ,py) of
the attack */
3 for iτx ← −Lt to Lt do
4 for iθ ← −Lθ to Lθ do
/* Initialize parameter . */;
5 θ ← Tarдetθ + iθ , τx ← Tarдetτx + τx i;
6 for iter ← 1 to N do
/* Calculate adversarial loss */;
7 ladv ← Equation 7.;
/* Update the parameters θ ,τx , sh based on
optimizer opt and loss ladv */
8 ;
9 θ ,τx , sh ← opt(ladv;θ ,τx , sh )
10 if lmin < ladv then
11 θ f inal ,τ
f inal
x , s
f inal
h ← θ ,τx , sh
12 end
13 end
14 end
15 T ′ ← GT (θ f inal , t f inalx , sf inalh ;T );
16 X ′ ← X +T ′;
Return: T ′
